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DUAL INCOME TAXATION AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt* 
The dual income tax combines a progressive tax on 
labor income and a lower flat rate tax on income from 
capital.  Denmark, Finland, $orway, and Sweden adopted 
dual income taxes to address a set of tax challenges that 
arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Although 
developing countries face much different economic, 
political, and tax environments from the $ordic countries, 
the dual income tax may be the right solution to the 
different set of challenges facing many developing 
countries. 
Providing separate tax rates for labor and capital 
income allows countries greater flexibility in addressing 
tax competition while retaining progressive tax rates for 
labor income.  A dual income tax regime may also allow 
developing countries to rationalize the taxation of income 
from active business operations under the personal and 
corporate tax systems and the taxation of passive 
investment income under the personal tax system.  
Developing countries could also use the move to a dual 
income tax system as an opportunity to make broader 
reforms in their personal, corporate, and payroll tax 
systems. 
Finally, recent tax reforms in Russia, Ukraine, and 
several countries in Central and Eastern Europe have led 
to flat tax regimes that generally apply a single tax rate to 
all types of income above some zero-bracket amount. We 
contend that a dual income tax may provide policymakers 
in developing countries with an attractive alternative that 
addresses tax competition concerns while maintaining a 
progressive tax on labor income. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Businesses often seek to find new applications for existing 
products.  TNT was originally designed as a yellow dye.  Listerine, a 
popular mouthwash, was used as an antiseptic for surgery.  Viagra was 
initially designed to treat hypertension.  The dual income tax, a 
combination of a progressive tax on labor income and a lower flat rate tax 
on income from capital, was adopted in the Nordic countries to address a 
set of tax challenges that arose in the late 1980s.  Although developing 
countries face much different economic, political, and tax environments 
from the Nordic countries, the dual income tax may be the right solution to 
the different set of challenges facing many developing countries. 
Almost all income tax regimes combine a personal income tax and 
a corporate income tax.  The personal income tax generally applies to wage 
income, as well as different types of income from capital such as dividends, 
interest, rents, royalties, and profits from sole proprietorships and 
partnerships.  The corporate income tax generally applies to profits on 
entities operating in corporate form.  The dual income tax seeks to tax 
wages and labor income attributable to sole proprietorships and 
partnerships at progressive tax rates and tax capital income at a flat rate 
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under either the personal or corporate tax systems. 
Transplanting legal regimes, like using prescription drugs for 
purposes other than those for which they were designed, may result in 
undesirable and unintended consequences.1  Nonetheless, dual income 
taxation may be an effective tool to improve income taxation in developing 
countries.  Global competition provides strong incentives for countries to 
reduce tax rates, especially developing countries that are more dependent 
on foreign capital inflows.  Providing separate tax rates for labor and capital 
income allows countries greater flexibility in addressing tax competition 
and greater opportunity to retain progressive tax rates for labor income.  A 
dual income tax regime may also allow developing countries to rationalize 
the taxation of income from active business operations under the personal 
and corporate tax systems and the taxation of passive investment income 
under the personal tax system.  Developing countries could also use the 
move to a dual income tax system as an opportunity to make broader 
reforms in their personal, corporate, and payroll tax systems.  
The dual income tax approach rejects the long-held ideal of a 
progressive global personal income tax (a “comprehensive income tax”).2  
To some, this may seem a step in the wrong direction.  For decades, tax 
policy advisors in both developed and developing countries focused on a 
comprehensive income tax as an essential keystone to any modern tax 
system.  Although there have always been those who questioned the 
conventional wisdom, the comprehensive income tax was long accepted as 
the ideal towards which all income tax systems should strive.3 
In reality, however, the personal income tax system in most 
developing countries (as well as most developed countries) has never been 
 
 1. Legal sociologists sometimes argue that “legal transplants” are virtually 
impossible.  Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURE 55 
(David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001). 
 2. Tax systems are considered global if they include income from all sources in a 
common tax base.  Tax systems are progressive if higher marginal income tax rates apply to 
greater amounts of taxable income.  The general recommendations of tax advisors in recent 
decades for a “broad-based, low rate” approach to tax reform in developing countries do not 
represent a shift away from the comprehensive income tax approach.  Richard M. Bird, The 
BBLR Approach to Tax Reform in Emerging Countries, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS:  THEORY AND 
POLICY (M. Govinda Rao & Mihir Rakshit eds., forthcoming 2010). 
 3. Distinguished academics such as Stanley Surrey and Richard Musgrave spread the 
word to developing countries to help modernize and improve the design and implementation 
of tax systems.  See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey & Oliver Oldman, Report of Preliminary Survey 
of the Tax System of Argentina, 16 PUBLIC FINANCE 155 (1961); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & 
MALCOLM GILLIS, FISCAL REFORM FOR COLOMBIA:  FINAL REPORT AND STAFF PAPERS OF THE 
COLOMBIAN COMMISSION ON TAX REFORM (1971); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL REFORM 
IN BOLIVIA:  FINAL REPORT OF THE BOLIVIAN MISSION ON TAX REFORM (1981). 
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global or very progressive.4  The so-called comprehensive income tax 
system is often a set of incomplete and sometimes inconsistent rules 
applicable to different types of income.  Developing countries face serious 
challenges in improving the taxation of income, whether from labor, 
capital, or a combination of labor and capital.5  The result is that personal 
income taxes play a very limited role in developing countries.6  Many 
developing countries subject income from capital to relatively light 
effective tax burdens under the personal income tax system through policy 
design, poor tax administration, or both.  However, the way in which 
countries achieve this low tax burden is often so cumbersome and 
inefficient that countries reap both the costs of taxing capital (economic 
distortions, compliance, and enforcement costs) and the costs of failing to 
do so (inequity, as well as administrative problems from tax arbitrage). 
Developing countries also face serious challenges in implementing 
corporate income tax systems.  Low-income developing countries are more 
likely than high-income developing countries or developed countries to 
adopt tax incentives that reduce the corporate tax base.7  Tax holidays, tax-
free zones, and other tax incentives erode the potential corporate income tax 
base and may, sometimes deliberately, create advantages for foreign over 
domestic firms.  While all countries face difficulties in taxing the 
agricultural sector and small businesses, developing countries face greater 
challenges both because of the lack of administrative capacity to tax these 
sectors effectively and because the costs of taxes and other forms of 
government regulation may outweigh the benefits from operating in a 
formal economy.  This encourages businesses to stay in the informal sector 
and discourages modernization and growth.8 
One way to improve tax regimes in developing countries is to 
 
 4. In all countries, a large portion of private savings is tax-favored.  Low or no taxes 
apply to savings in owner-occupied housing, pension and other retirement savings.  See, e.g., 
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 1145 (1992).  Weak tax administration in developing countries accentuates both the 
equity and efficiency problems that arise from such differential treatment.  Richard M. Bird 
& Eric M. Zolt, Tax Policy in Emerging Countries, 26 ENV’T & PLAN C:  GOV’T & POL’Y 73 
(2008). 
 5. Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for Emerging Markets:  Developing 
Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/35, 2000). 
 6. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation:  The Limited Role of 
the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005). 
 7. Michael Keen & Alejandro Simone, Tax Policy in Developing Countries:  Some 
Lessons from the 1990s, and Some Challenges Ahead, in HELPING COUNTRIES DEVELOP:  
THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY 302, 327–32 (Sanjeev Gupta, Ben Clements & Gabriela 
Inchauste eds., Int’l Monetary Fund 2004). 
 8. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, Shadow Economies around the World:  
Size, Causes, and Consequences (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/26, 2000). 
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abandon taxing income from capital and move to a personal consumption 
tax of the types that have been proposed over the last few decades.9  We 
believe good reasons exist to retain both personal and corporate income 
taxes.  Although the personal income tax in most developing countries is 
limited in its ability to redistribute income, it can and should play an 
important role both in generating revenues and in helping to establish a 
more politically cohesive and stable state.10  Despite its flaws the personal 
income tax is probably the only significantly progressive element found in 
most developing countries’ tax systems.11  In addition, the corporate income 
tax plays a much greater role in raising revenue in developing countries 
than in developed countries and, in particular, succeeds in capturing at least 
some location-specific rents.12 
Although we focus here on the dual income tax in the developing 
country context, we note that many of the same advantages and 
disadvantages of moving from a nominal comprehensive income tax to a 
dual income tax apply to the United States and other developed countries.  
The U.S. tax system, like other tax systems, already subjects income from 
capital to tax treatment different from the treatment of income from labor,13 
including lower tax rates applicable to dividends and capital gains.14  
Global competition provides incentive to reform tax systems and tax 
competition concerns in the U.S. have prompted legislative proposals to 
reduce corporate income tax rates significantly below tax rates under the 
personal income tax system.15  The U.S. Department of Treasury has 
 
 9. For a useful review of such proposals that have been made in the U.S., see Charles 
McLure & George Zodrow, Consumption-Based Direct Taxes:  A Guided Tour of the 
Amusement Park, 63 FINANZARCHIV:  PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 285 (2007). 
 10. CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND 
EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 526 (1986) note that the extent to which a nation’s 
finances rely on the taxation of income has historically been considered “a mirror of 
democracy” in the sense that it symbolized the commitment to social justice.  More recently, 
the important political dimension of taxation as a means of building state capacity in 
developing countries has been emphasized.  See generally TAXATION AND STATE-BUILDING 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Deborah Brautigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad & Mick Moore eds., 
2008). 
 11. Ke-young Chu, Hamid Reza Davoodi & Sanjeev Gupta, Income Distribution and 
Tax and Government Social Spending Policies in Developing Countries 35 (UNU/WIDER 
Working Papers No. 214, 2000). 
 12. Peter Birch Sørensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?, 53 
CESIFO ECON. STUD. 172, 181 (2007). 
 13. See generally Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX 
REV. 39 (1996). 
 14. Certain dividends are subject to tax as net capital gains under I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) and 
capital gains qualify for lower tax rates.  I.R.C. § 1(h) (2010). 
 15. For example, Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore) and Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) have 
proposed legislation to reduce corporate tax rates from 35% to 24%.  Bipartisan Tax 
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previously given serious consideration to forms of dual income taxation.  
As discussed in Section II.D, in 1992, the Treasury Department included as 
part of its report on the integration of the personal and corporate tax system 
a prototype called the “Comprehensive Business Income Tax” that is a form 
of dual income taxation.16  We believe that a move to a dual income tax 
regime in the United States, as for developing countries, would be an 
improvement over the current tax system.17 
We begin in Section II with a brief review of the Nordic experience 
with dual income tax regimes and several parallel reforms that have been 
proposed or implemented in other developed countries, including the 
United States.18  Section III then reviews the different ways in which 
developing countries might implement a dual income tax regime and 
considers briefly the possible advantages and disadvantages of the different 
approaches.  Substantial differences exist in the political, economic and tax 
environments both between and among developed and developing 
countries.  These differences influence both the form and desirability of 
separating the taxation of labor and capital income.  
Section IV compares the dual income tax with flat tax proposals of 
the type that have been adopted in several Eastern European countries and 
the countries of the former Soviet Union.  We argue that the dual income 
tax, properly conceived, can combine many of the advantages of flat tax 
regimes with the traditional virtues of a personal income tax system that has 
                                                                                                                 
Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, S. ___, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010). 
 16. See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text.  DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS—TAXING BUSINESS INCOME 
ONCE 106 (1992) [hereinafter United States Treasury].  One of the co-authors of this Article, 
Eric Zolt, while serving as Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, Office of Tax Policy, was one 
of the primary authors of the Treasury Report. 
 17. See also Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax:  $ordic 
Precedents, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 41 (2010) (arguing that an implementable dual income 
tax would likely be superior on equity and efficiency grounds to the current tax system). 
 18. For reviews of dual income systems in developed countries, see Sijbren Cnossen, 
Taxing Capital Income in the $ordic Countries:  A Model for the European Union?, in 
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 180, 
211 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000); Bernd Genser & Andreas Reutter, Fiscal Policy in Action:  
Moving Toward Dual Income Taxation in Europe, 63 FINANZARCHIV:  PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS  
436 (2007); Kleinbard, supra note 17; Peter Birch Sørensen, Dual Income Taxation:  Why 
and How?, 61 FINANZARCHIV 559 (2005) [hereinafter Sørensen (2005)]; Peter Birch 
Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax to the Dual Income Tax:  Recent Tax Reforms in the 
$ordic Countries, 1 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 57 (1994) [hereinafter Sørensen, From the 
Global Income Tax].  Earlier discussions of the dual income tax in developing countries may 
be found in Robin W. Boadway, Income Tax Reform for a Globalized World:  The Case for 
a Dual Income Tax, 16 J. ASIAN ECON. 910 (2005) and Alberto Barreix & Jerónimo Roca, 
Strengthening a Fiscal Pillar:  The Uruguayan Dual Income Tax, 92 CEPAL REV. 121 
(2007). 
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explicitly progressive tax rates.  All major tax policy or tax administration 
reforms carry economic and political risks, and the risk-reward calculus 
will differ from country to country.  Nonetheless, the move to a dual 
income tax may facilitate a number of useful broader tax reforms in 
developing countries, including reducing or eliminating corporate tax 
incentives, rationalizing the taxation of portfolio income of domestic and 
foreign investors, adopting withholding regimes that may increase tax 
compliance and tax revenue, coordinating presumptive tax regimes for 
small and medium businesses with the corporate tax system, and integrating 
payroll or social security tax systems with the personal income tax systems.  
Section V concludes. 
II. DUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
A. The $ordic Pioneers 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden were among the first 
countries to explicitly reject the comprehensive income tax model and 
adopt separate tax regimes for taxing income from labor and income from 
capital.  While Denmark was the first country to adopt a dual income tax, it 
has subsequently moved to a hybrid comprehensive income tax and a dual 
income tax system.19  Table 1 describes the dual tax regimes in those 
countries as of 2008. 
  
 
 19. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 60–61. 
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Table 1.  Dual Income Tax Regimes (2008)
20
 
 orway Finland Sweden Denmark 
Implementation of 
DIT 
1992 1993 1991 1987 
  




At Implementation  
Capital Income 28 25 30 50–56 
Personal Income 28–41.7 25–57 31–51 50–68 
     
2008  
Capital Income 28 28 30 59 
Personal Income 28–40 16–52.5* 29–62 38–59 
     
Corporate Tax Rate  
At Implementation 28 25 30 50 
2008 28 26 26.3 25 
* Excludes Church Tax 
 
Several factors contributed to the decisions to adopt dual income 
tax regimes in the Nordic countries.21  In the 1980s, these countries were 
concerned that domestic investors were transferring portfolio investments 
(such as bank deposits, stocks, and corporate and government bonds) 
outside their countries.  The highest marginal personal income tax rates in 
the mid-1980s ranged from 66% in Norway to 87% in Sweden.22  Given the 
 
 20. The data for this table are from Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 
18, at 59, IBFD, GLOBAL INDIVIDUAL TAX HANDBOOK (2008), and IBFD, GLOBAL 
CORPORATE TAX HANDBOOK (2008). 
 21. Steffen Ganghof provides an excellent review of the political considerations in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in reforming their tax systems to adopt dual income 
taxes.  STEFFEN GANGHOF, THE POLITICS OF INCOME TAXATION:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
77–111 (2006).  
 22. For example, Sweden’s top marginal rate under the personal income tax system 
was 87% in 1979, 65% in 1990, and 51% in 1991.  Sven Larson, The Swedish Tax System:  
Significant Features and Lessons for Policymakers, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 395, 396 (2006).  
Sweden was not alone in reducing tax rates.  Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan note that the GDP-
weighted average top statutory marginal personal income tax rate in the 108 countries for 
which they have data for the entire period was 62% in 1981, fell to 43% in 1991 and 
continued to decline to only 36% in 2005.  Klara Sabirianova Peter, Steve Buttrick & Denvil 
Duncan, Global Reform of Personal Income Taxation, 1981–2005:  Evidence from 189 
Countries (IZA Discussion Paper No. 42228, 2009). 
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high tax rates that individuals were facing on portfolio income in the Nordic 
countries, strong incentives existed for domestic investors to move their 
investments offshore to avoid domestic taxation.23  The globalization of 
capital markets made it easier for individual investors to establish and 
maintain investment and bank accounts outside their home country.24 
At the same time, relatively high inflation rates resulted in 
substantial effective tax rates on capital income.25  Even at modest rates of 
inflation, subjecting nominal interest income to tax rates over 50% results 
in very high effective tax rates on real interest income.  Tax systems in 
most countries do not provide for adjustments for inflation.26  The 
combination of high tax rates, relatively effective tax administration, and no 
inflation adjustments made the problems more acute in the Nordic 
countries.27  Applying a low flat rate to capital income provided a rough 
adjustment for inflation.28 
The then-existing tax regimes in the Nordic countries also provided 
substantial tax preferences for capital investments.29  As in other countries, 
these preferences often took the form of current deductibility of many 
expenses while taxes on the income associated with the expenses were 
deferred.  In particular, the full deductibility of interest on debt incurred to 
finance tax-favored assets resulted in negative effective tax rates on capital 
income.30  Taxpayers used deductions associated with capital income to 
 
 23. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18; Peter Birch Sørensen, The 
$ordic Dual Income Tax:  Principles, Practices, and Relevance for Canada, 55 CAN. TAX J. 
557, 565–66 (2007) [hereinafter Sørensen, The $ordic Dual Income Tax]. 
 24. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18; Sørensen, The $ordic Dual 
Income Tax, supra note 23. 
 25. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 62–64; Sørensen, The 
$ordic Dual Income Tax, supra note 23, at 11. 
 26. Victor Thuronyi, Adjusting for Inflation, in TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 434 
(Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998). 
 27. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18; Sørensen, The $ordic Dual 
Income Tax, supra note 23. 
 28. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18; Sørensen, The $ordic Dual 
Income Tax, supra note 23. 
 29. Sørensen, The $ordic Dual Income Tax, supra note 23, at 10. 
 30. Sørensen contends that before introducing dual income tax regimes, Norway and 
Sweden likely had negative tax revenue on capital income under the personal income tax 
system.  Id.  Similar results have been found in other developed countries.  For a discussion 
of revenue from taxation of capital income in the United States, see Roger Gordon & Joel 
Slemrod, Do We Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, 2 TAX POL. & THE 
ECON. 89 (1988) and Roger Gordon, Laura Kalambodidis & Joel Slemrod, Do We Now 
Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 981 (2004); for a 
discussion of revenue from taxation of capital income in Germany, see Johannes Becker & 
Clemens Fuest, Does Germany Collect Revenue from Taxing Capital Income? (CESifo 
Working Paper No. 1489, 2003). 
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reduce their tax liability on labor income.31  By establishing separate tax 
regimes for income from labor and capital, the Nordic countries were able 
to stop the erosion of the tax base for labor income.32  Lowering the tax rate 
on capital income made it possible for the Nordic countries to broaden the 
capital income tax base.33 
Finally, the economies of the Nordic countries faced difficult 
challenges during this time period.  In particular, substantial concerns 
existed about high levels of unemployment.  While Nordic levels of 
unemployment were low by international standards, the levels of 
unemployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s were high by historical 
standards (and would continue to increase).34  These concerns helped 
provide political support for reducing the tax burden on income from 
capital as a means to increase economic activity.35 
In addition to the challenges facing the Nordic countries, tax 
reforms throughout the world in the mid-to-late 1980s had resulted in 
significant rate cuts for individual and corporate income taxes.36  While the 
Nordic countries increased taxes on consumption during this period, large 
social programs still required substantial revenues from income taxes to 
fund government operations.37  Essentially, these countries faced two 
choices in reforming their income tax systems:  reduce tax rates for all 
 
 31. Cnossen, supra note 18, at 191. 
 32. The U.S. took a different approach to protect the labor tax base in its 1986 reform 
by adopting loss rules that prevented taxpayers from sheltering labor income from losses 
associated with passive investments.  I.R.C § 469 (2010). 
 33. Sørensen, The $ordic Dual Income Tax, supra note 23, at 10. 
 34. After a decade with an unemployment rate averaging only 2.5%, unemployment in 
Norway began to rise sharply in 1989 to a peak of 6.0% in 1993, followed by gradual 
decline to 3.2% by the end of the 1990s.  Unemployment in Sweden was even lower in the 
1980s, but began to rise sharply in 1991, peaking at 10.0% in 1997.  OECD Statistics, LFS 
by sex and age - indicators, 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R (select “Unemployment 
rate” in Series; then select “All persons” in Sex; then select “Total” in Age; then click “Time 
& Frequency” hyperlink and select 1979 to 1999; then click “View Data”) (last visited May. 
14, 2010). 
 35. For a discussion of the politics of tax reform in Sweden, see Sven Steinmo, 
Globalization and Taxation:  Challenges to the Swedish Welfare State, 3 COMP. POL. STUD. 
839 (2002). 
 36. Peter, Buttrick & Duncan, supra note 22, at 48 (on individual income taxes) and 
Michael Devereux, Ben Lockwood & Michela Redoano, Do Countries Compete Over 
Corporate Tax Rates?, 92 J. OF PUB. ECON. 1210, 1222 (2008) (on corporate income tax 
rates). 
 37. For information on changes in reliance on consumption taxes in the Nordic 
countries, see OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS, 2008 EDITION Tables 3.1, 3.2, at 41–42 
(2009).  For an interesting detailed appraisal of the historic evolution of the Nordic tax 
financing model, see PETER LINDERT, GROWING PUBLIC:  SOCIAL SPENDING AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 235–45, 267–95 (2003). 
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income and generate insufficient income tax revenue to support social 
programs, or bifurcate the tax regime and apply a lower rate to income from 
capital while maintaining higher progressive tax rates on labor income.  The 
Nordic countries chose the latter approach. 
Steffen Ganghof has set out a taxonomy that nicely demonstrates 
the competing considerations a country may face in designing an income 
tax system.38  Ganghof begins with three domestic policy goals that 
governments may consider in designing an income tax regime.  The first 
goal is tax progressivity.39  This goal addresses vertical equity concerns by 
requiring high-income recipients to pay a higher proportion of their income 
in tax.40  The second goal is comprehensiveness, which requires equal 
treatment of income from capital and income from labor.41  This addresses 
horizontal equity concerns, and along with the first goal, results in taxing 
individuals in accordance with “ability to pay” principles.42  The third goal 
is symmetry, which exists when all types of capital income are subject to the 
same tax regime.43  This goal addresses concerns of allocative efficiency as 
well as tax-induced distortions in investment and savings decisions.44 
In a closed economy, a comprehensive income tax can theoretically 
satisfy these three objectives.  At least in its ideal form, the comprehensive 
income tax achieves all three goals by taxing income from all sources 
equally, in a progressive manner according to a taxpayer’s ability to pay, so 
that a taxpayer faces the same tax regime for different types of capital 
income.45  With the competitive pressures in an open economy, however, 
all three goals are rarely met.  When international competitiveness is added 
to the three domestic tax policy goals, governments may no longer be able 
to satisfy all goals, particularly as cross-border mobility of capital varies 
both between types of capital and types of countries.46  In Ganghof’s 
terminology, governments face an income tax quadrilemma:  their only 
choice is which goal to sacrifice:  progressivity, comprehensiveness, 
 
 38. Steffen Ganghof, Global Markets, $ational Tax Systems, and Domestic Politics:  
Rebalancing Efficiency and Equity in Open States’ Income Taxation 7–14 (Max Planck 
Institute Discussion Paper, 2001) [hereinafter Ganghof (2001)]; Steffen Ganghof, The 
Politics of (Income) Tax Structure (Yale Conference on Distributive Politics, Working 
Paper, 2005). 
 39. Ganghof (2001), supra note 38, at 8. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 8–9. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 9. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 9–11. 
 46. Sørensen, supra note 12, at 181–84. 
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symmetry, or competitiveness.47 
Depending on economic and political factors, countries face 
different considerations in determining which objective to sacrifice.  The 
Nordic countries sacrificed comprehensiveness by providing different 
treatment for capital and labor income.48  Other countries have chosen at 
various times to sacrifice progressivity, symmetry, or competitiveness.49  
Because of the different tax environments facing the Nordic countries and 
developing countries, many of the specific considerations that prompted the 
Nordic countries to sacrifice comprehensiveness may not apply in 
developing countries.  Nonetheless, as we argue below, developing 
countries may be able to improve their tax system substantially by 
sacrificing comprehensiveness and adopting separate tax regimes for capital 
and labor income. 
B. Design of Dual Income Tax Systems 
As Table 1 shows, the dual income tax systems in Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden provide for a progressive income tax rate schedule applicable 
to labor income and a flat tax rate on capital income.50  Under this 
approach, an individual’s tax liability depends not only on total income, but 
also on the split between labor and capital income.51  The tax rate on capital 
income is at or near the lowest positive rate for labor income and the 
highest marginal tax rate on labor income is about 15–25% higher than the 
tax rate on capital income.52  However, as discussed below, many variant 
designs are also possible.  For instance, in the so-called “pure” version of 
the dual income tax, the tax rate on capital income is aligned with the 
 
 47. See Ganghof (2001), supra note 38, at 14–25. 
 48. Id. at 19–23. 
 49. Denmark chose to sacrifice symmetry also by imposing differential tax rates on 
capital income.  Australia also sacrificed symmetry, but in a different way, by electing to cut 
only the corporate income tax rate.  New Zealand chose instead to cut all income tax rates, 
thus sacrificing progressivity.  Ganghof (2001), supra note 38, at 14–25.  See also Steffen 
Ganghof and Richard Eccleston, Globalization and the Dilemmas of Income Taxation in 
Australia, 39 AUST. J. POL. SCI. 519, 530 (2006).  In contrast, Germany, until its most recent 
reforms, sacrificed competitiveness in order to retain the other three objectives. 
 50. Good descriptions of the Nordic dual income tax systems may be found in Genser 
and Reutter, supra note 18, and Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18.  
 51. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 61. 
 52. In the initial dual income tax reforms, only Norway aligned the personal tax rate on 
capital income with the lowest positive tax rate on labor income.  In Finland, the rate on 
capital income was slightly higher than the lowest positive labor tax rate and in Sweden the 
personal income tax rate on capital income was slightly lower than the lowest positive labor 
tax rate.  Denmark kept progressive taxes on both labor and capital income, with lower rates 
on the latter.  
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corporate tax rate.53  Income from capital taxable under the dual income tax 
system generally includes business profits, dividends, interest, rents and 
some types of royalties.  In principle, policymakers could also choose to 
expand the scope of dual income tax systems to include such items as 
imputed rent on owner-occupied housing and returns on pension savings (as 
well as other forms of current tax-favored savings) in capital income.54 
The tax systems differ in how they divide income from labor and 
capital for purposes of determining tax liability.  Finland and Sweden 
generally applied a strict schedular approach, placing labor income and 
capital income in separate baskets.  Finland and Sweden adopted separate 
rate schedules for labor and capital income, limited the use of capital losses 
to offset labor income, and provided for any personal allowances to be 
applied only to labor income.55  In contrast, before the 2004 tax reforms, 
Norway provided for a “general” tax base that was taxed at a single flat rate 
and qualified for personal allowances.56  Both capital and labor incomes 
were included in the general tax base, but only labor income was included 
in the “personal” tax base.57  The personal tax base was subject to 
progressive tax rates, but contained a substantial zero-bracket amount that 
resulted in only relatively high levels of labor income being subject to the 
higher progressive tax rates.  This version of a dual income tax is equivalent 
to a flat tax on all income with a surcharge on labor income above a certain 
threshold. 
 
 53. A truly “pure” version would provide for full integration of personal and corporate 
level taxes to avoid double taxation of corporate income.  For example, Sørensen and 
Johnson propose combining a dual income tax with an allowance for corporate equity to 
eliminate double taxation.  Peter Birch Sørensen & Shane Matthew Johnson, Taxing Capital 
Income—Options for Reform in Australia 100 (Paper prepared for Australia’s Future Tax 
System Conference June 2009), available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/html/conference/downloads/attachment_08_Draft_P
eter_Birch_Sorensen_paper.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010).  But integration is not a 
necessary consequence of aligning the capital income and corporate income tax rates.  
Norway historically provided the greatest degree of integration.  Until 2005, Norway 
eliminated the double taxation of equity income by providing an imputation system for 
distributed dividends and allowed shareholders to increase the basis of their corporate shares 
by their pro-rata amount of the retained profits that was subject to corporate tax.  In the 
Norwegian tax system this was known by its Norwegian acronym RISK.  Vidar 
Christiansen, $orwegian Income Tax Reforms, 2 CESIFO DICE REPORT, Autumn 2004, at 9, 
10.  A similar version was proposed by the U.S. Treasury Department as a deemed dividend 
reinvestment plan (DRIP) system.  United States Treasury, supra note 16, at 106. 
 54. Robin W. Boadway, The Dual Income Tax System—An Overview, 2 CESIFO DICE 
REPORT, Autumn 2004, at 3, 7.  For such a tax proposal for Australia, see Sørensen and 
Johnson, supra note 53.  A dual income tax could include returns on consumer durables and 
returns to human capital accumulation, although no proposal has yet gone that far. 
 55. Cnossen, supra note 18, at 183–86. 
 56. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 54–55. 
 57. Id. 
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C. Arbitrage Opportunities 
The move from a comprehensive income tax to a dual income tax 
regime generally presents tax planning (or tax evasion) opportunities.  
Lower tax rates on income from capital than on income from labor create a 
strong incentive to characterize income from labor as income from capital.  
This incentive exists in many tax systems, especially those that provide for 
favorable tax treatment for capital gains or subject labor income to payroll 
or social security taxes that substantially increase the effective marginal tax 
rates for labor income but leave unchanged the tax rates for income from 
capital.58 
The major challenge in the Nordic dual tax systems is to limit a 
taxpayer’s ability to convert labor income from self-employment (such as 
sole proprietorships or partnerships) or from wages of owner-employees of 
closely-held corporations into income from capital.  The dual income tax 
regimes of the four countries reflect different approaches to prevent 
taxpayers from transforming labor income into capital income. 
One approach provides for an imputed return to the firm’s business 
assets by multiplying the value of the assets by an assumed rate of return on 
capital (for instance, the interest rate on government debt plus some risk 
premium).59  The asset base could be the firm’s gross assets, in which case 
the firm’s financial liabilities are not deducted from the asset base.60  
Alternatively, countries could determine the imputed return of the net assets 
and thus provide a deduction for business liabilities (as well as adjusting net 
profits for interest deductions).61  Profits in excess of this imputed return are 
deemed to be returns from labor and are subject to taxation as labor income 
whether or not distributed to the owner.62 
Taxpayers may also seek to avoid higher tax rates on labor income 
in cases where owner-employees own a large percentage of the shares of 
 
 58. Sørensen, supra note 12, at 213. 
 59. For example, the Norwegian approach uses the interest rate on 5-year government 
bonds plus a risk premium of 4%.  If the imputed rate of return equals the interest on 
business debt, it will not matter whether the calculation is based on gross assets or net assets 
(excluding liabilities).  If the rates differ, taxpayers under a net asset regime may have 
incentives to adjust their borrowings to maximize the amount of income from capital.  
 60. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 73–75. 
 61. Sørensen notes that Norway adopted a version of the gross asset approach, Finland 
and Sweden adopted versions of the net asset approach, and Denmark adopted a regime that 
allows taxpayers to choose between variations of the two approaches.  Sørensen (2005), 
supra note 18, at 573. 
 62. A variation of this approach uses the costs of shares as the base for computing the 
return to capital and then treats any excess returns as labor income. 
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closely-held corporations.63  Such owner-employees will seek to minimize 
their wage compensation and extract returns in the form of lower taxed 
dividends and capital gains.  To limit this tax strategy, countries could tax 
normal returns to capital as income from capital, and then tax excess returns 
to capital under the progressive tax rates applicable to labor income.64  
Alternatively, countries could choose to require closely-held businesses to 
be taxed as flow-through entities, regardless of legal form of organization.65 
The rules designed to prevent re-characterization of income 
generated their own set of distortions.  For example, the regime that 
determines capital income with reference to the amount of capital invested 
encourages taxpayers to stuff significant assets into their corporations that 
are related to business operations.  Those rules that only apply to closely-
held corporations with a percentage of active owners encourage taxpayers 
to add passive owners to avoid application of these rules.66  The larger the 
spreads between the flat tax rate applicable to capital income, the corporate 
tax rates, and the progressive tax rates applicable to labor income, the 
greater the arbitrage opportunities.  While the Nordic and other countries 
face significant challenges to prevent taxpayers from disguising labor 
income as capital income, as we discuss later, different considerations may 
apply in developing countries. 
 
 63. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 75–76; Kleinbard, supra 
note 17, at 64–67. 
 64. In part because of the difficulties in taxing closely held businesses, Norway 
changed its dual income tax regime to tax the normal returns to capital at a lower flat rate, 
but tax excess returns of closely held corporations at the higher progressive tax rates 
applicable to labor income.  Sørensen (2005), supra note 18, at 575–79; Peter Birch 
Sørensen, $eutral Taxation of Shareholder Income, 12 INT’L. TAX & PUB. FIN. 777 (2005). 
 65. Sørensen notes that the mandatory income-splitting features of the Norwegian tax 
system worked relatively well when applied to self-employed taxpayers, but were less 
effective when applied to active owners of small corporations.  Sørensen, supra note 12, at 
214–17.  These employee-shareholders could avoid the mandatory income-splitting rules by 
increasing the percentage of shares owned by passive investors to avoid treating part of the 
income they received from the corporation as income from labor.  Beginning in 2006, active 
owners of small businesses in Norway were taxed at the lower capital income tax rates on 
the imputed normal rate of return on the value of their shareholdings, but at the higher 
effective tax rate applicable to labor income for amounts of realized income (dividends and 
capital gains) in excess of the normal rate of return.  The business sector in all countries 
consists of very heterogeneous firms.  Consequently, no one right system to distinguish labor 
and capital income exists, even in the most technologically and administratively advanced 
countries. 
 66. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 75–76; Kleinbard, supra 
note 17, at 66–67. 
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D. Reforms and Proposals Outside the $ordic Countries 
Over the years, several countries outside the Nordic region have 
considered or adopted different types of dual income tax systems.67  Even 
under a comprehensive income tax, tax regimes frequently establish 
different effective taxes on different types of income.68  Important elements 
of dual income tax regimes already exist in many countries.  For example, 
many countries have adopted final withholding taxes on interest and 
dividends at rates below the top marginal rates under the personal income 
tax system.69  Elements of dual income tax regimes are also present in 
regimes that provide rate preferences or exclusions for capital gains. 
Different tax regimes for income from capital and income from 
labor have been discussed extensively in many countries, including the 
United States.  In the U.S., a version of a dual income tax was proposed by 
the U.S. Department of Treasury in 1992, the Comprehensive Business 
Income Tax (CBIT).70  The “classical” corporate income tax system distorts 
choices between operating in non-corporate and corporate form, choosing 
between debt finance and equity finance, and retaining rather than 
distributing corporate profits.71  The U.S. Treasury was concerned about the 
range of tax treatment applicable to income from entities operating in 
corporate form.72  In some cases, corporate income was subject to double 
taxation under the personal and corporate tax systems.73  In other cases, 
however, income attributed to corporate entities was subject to zero tax (for 
 
 67. See, e.g., OECD, OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES NO. 13, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX, (2006) (providing a brief review of dual and “semi-dual” income 
tax systems in OECD countries); Barreix and Roca, supra note 18 (reviewing dual income 
tax systems in Latin America and Spain). 
 68. Zolt, supra note 13. 
 69. In Europe, for instance, such countries include Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland.  Genser & Reutter, supra note 18, at 448. 
 70. United States Treasury, supra note 16, at 39–60. 
 71. Investment decisions with respect to industry, asset mix, location, risk-taking, and 
timing may be influenced by variations in effective tax rates.  Inter-temporal decisions, like 
inter-sectoral decisions, are also affected by taxes on capital income, with the result that 
private savings are diminished.  Moreover, the complexity of corporate taxes may impose 
significant costs and barriers to the expansion of new and small firms, while uncertainty as 
to the precise tax implications of various corporate decisions may act as a general deterrent 
to investment.  For a recent comprehensive review of the distortions arising from typical 
corporate income taxes see Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, 
Taxing Corporate Income, Paper prepared for the Mirrlees Report (March 2008). 
 72. United States Treasury, supra note 16, at 3–14. 
 73. Corporate income is taxed first when earned at the corporate level and then again 
upon distribution to shareholders under the personal income tax.  Corporate income may also 
be subject to double taxation when shareholders recognize capital gains attributable to 
previously taxed, but not distributed, corporate income.  
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example, interest income paid to tax-exempt entities or portfolio interest 
paid to foreign holders) or three or more layers of tax (for example, for 
multiple levels of corporate holdings not subject to consolidation).74  The 
1992 Treasury Report set forth various proposals to reduce distortions and 
rationalize the treatment of business income.75  The policy aim was to 
design a tax regime that subjected business income to a single layer of tax.76 
In the U.S., as well as many other countries, taxpayers can choose 
among different types of legal forms in which to conduct business 
operations.77  While there may be valid business and legal reasons to allow 
taxpayers to choose among different legal forms, differential tax treatment 
of those different legal forms is much less compelling.78  An additional 
objective of the CBIT proposal was to design a tax regime that would be 
applicable to business income, without regard to the legal form chosen by 
an individual or groups of individuals to conduct operations.79 
Finally, the CBIT proposal addressed the concern of differential tax 
treatment of debt and equity capital, both at the corporate level, where 
interest paid on debt was deductible and dividends paid on common shares 
were not deductible, and at the investor level, where tax-exempt and tax-
favored investors paid little or no tax on interest and dividends received.80  
Holders of debt and equity have similar claims to the cash flow of the 
business activity, subject to different competing rights as to risk, return, 
duration and control.81  While good reasons may exist for treating debt and 
equity capital differently for economic and legal purposes, differential tax 
treatment is, again, much less compelling. 
The easiest ways to eliminate the distinction between debt and 
equity in the corporate tax regime are either to provide deductions for 
dividends paid or to disallow interest deductions.  The CBIT proposal 
eliminated the usual deduction for interest payments in order to impose tax 
 
 74. United States Treasury, supra note 16, at 12. 
 75. Id. at 15–60. 
 76. Id. at 12–14. 
 77. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill & Sanford Holo, Choice of Entity:  Considerations and 
Consequences, in 61 MAJOR TAX PLANNING Ch. 5 (USC Inst. Fed. Tax’n 2009). 
 78. William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax 
Regimes:  Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1010–17 
(1995). 
 79. Many countries treat small businesses differently for various reasons of varying 
persuasiveness.  For a recent discussion of taxing small businesses in developing countries, 
see WORLD BANK GROUP, DESIGNING A TAX SYSTEM FOR MICRO AND SMALL BUSINESSES:  
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS (2007). 
 80. United States Treasury, supra note 16, at 67–69. 
 81. G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 887, 941–43 (2000). 
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liability on the share of business income attributable to debt capital.82  This 
was the most controversial aspect of the proposal partly because it resulted 
in clear winners and losers among corporate taxpayers and investors.83  
Alternatively, the CBIT proposal could have included a deduction for 
interest at the corporate level and a tax on the investor level collected 
through final withholding (at the corporate tax rate).84 
Simply put, CBIT was designed as a flat tax on business income, 
collected at the source (with no further taxation at the investor level).85  
CBIT is thus in effect a form of dual income tax that imposes a flat tax on 
income from businesses (regardless of form or label) while maintaining a 
progressive tax on labor income. 
III. DUAL INCOME TAX IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. Tax Systems in Developing Countries 
The tax environment in most developing countries differs 
substantially from that in developed countries.  Taxing patterns differ.  Tax 
burdens as a percentage of GDP are roughly 18% for developing countries, 
about half the tax-to-GDP ratio of developed countries.86  Developing 
countries rely relatively more on taxes on consumption rather than on 
income as compared to developed countries, with VATs and excise taxes 
providing a substantial portion of tax revenues.87  Whether measured as a 
percentage of GDP or a percentage of overall tax revenue, personal income 
taxes play a much smaller role in developing countries than in developed 
 
 82. The U.S. Treasury Department has generally required full deductibility of interest 
as a requirement for a foreign country’s income tax system to qualify as a tax on “net 
income” for tax credit purposes.  See Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George M. Zodrow, The 
Economic Case for Foreign Tax Credits for Cash Flow Taxes, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 1 (1998). 
 83. The move to the CBIT regime from the current regime would benefit those entities 
that rely relatively more on equity finance and penalize those firms that rely relatively more 
on debt finance. 
 84. This approach was problematic in the United States because of the current tax 
regime applicable to the large holdings of tax-exempt and non-resident investors in the U.S. 
corporate debt markets.  This would likely be of less concern in developing countries.  For a 
discussion of CBIT with final withholding on interest, see Cnossen, supra note 18, at 211. 
 85. As we discuss briefly later, it is difficult to determine how best to treat capital gains 
under any income tax regime, whether in developed or developing countries.  See infra notes 
148–149 and accompanying text. 
 86. Roy Bahl & Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy in Developing Countries:  Looking 
Back—and Forward, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 279 (2008); Tanzi & Zee, supra note 5, at 8. 
 87. Bird & Zolt, supra note 6, at 1630; Tanzi & Zee, supra note 5, at 9–15. 
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countries.88  While the revenue from corporate income taxes in developing 
countries varies substantially by region, corporate income taxes provide a 
major source of revenue in many countries, and generally, the poorer the 
country, the greater the proportion of total income taxes from corporate 
taxes.89 
Many developing countries have a large traditional agricultural 
sector and a significant informal (shadow) economy, both operating largely 
outside the formal tax system.90  No country has managed to tax either of 
these sectors effectively.91  These hard-to-tax sectors constitute a much 
higher portion of total economic activity in developing countries than in 
developed countries.92  As a result, the tax base that tax authorities can 
potentially reach is relatively small in many developing countries. 
Depending on the legal form of business operations, active business 
income could be taxed under either the personal income tax or corporate tax 
systems.  Alternatively, a country could adopt a business or an enterprise 
tax that applied to all forms of business—corporations, partnerships, and 
sole proprietorships.93  Developing countries have also adopted presumptive 
tax regimes that seek to tax business activity by reference to factors other 
than income.94 
 
 88. Bird & Zolt, supra note 6, at 1653–60. 
 89. Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structure in Developing Countries:  Many Puzzles and A 
Possible Explanation 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, No. 11267, 2005). 
 90. Schneider & Enste, supra note 8. 
 91. TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX:  LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE (James Alm, 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Sally Wallace, eds., 2004). 
 92. For estimates of the size of the informal sector in developing countries, see James 
Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, & Friedrich Schneider, “Sizing” the Problem of the Hard-to-
Tax, in TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX:  LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 11, 24 (James 
Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Sally Wallace eds., 2004).  The size of the informal 
economy may itself be a function of the design and implementation of the tax system.  For 
example, the high social insurance tax rates levied by some countries create an incentive for 
a large informal economy by discouraging employers from reporting the extent of 
employment and encouraging the under-reporting of wages.  Jan Rutkowski, Taxation of 
Labor, in FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  LESSONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND 
CENTRAL ASIA 281 (Cheryl Grey, Tracey Lane & Aristomene Varoudakis eds., 2007).  The 
resulting lower tax revenues often lead governments to raise tax rates still further, thus 
exacerbating incentives to evade taxes. 
 93. For example, Bolivia adopted an enterprise tax that applied to all businesses 
regardless of legal form.  MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 320. 
 94. Several Latin American countries such as Mexico and Colombia have imposed a 
presumptive tax on assets as a form of alternative minimum tax.  For further discussion, see 
Vito Tanzi & Efraim Sadka, A Tax on Gross Assets of Enterprises as a Form of Presumptive 
Taxation (IMF Working Paper, No. 92/16, 1992).  Such systems are also found in some 
developed countries.  For example, France taxes small farmers presumptively on the basis of 
a presumed return on land, and Israel uses a similar system, in part based on presumed return 
on assets, more widely.  Victor Thuronyi, Presumptive Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax, in 
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The sources of revenue under the personal income tax system vary 
substantially among countries.  While good comparative information about 
the revenue composition of personal income taxes in developing countries 
is not available, it is not uncommon for over 90% of personal income tax 
revenue in developing countries to come from wage withholding in the 
formal sector.95  It follows that personal income tax systems in developing 
countries raise relatively small amounts of revenue from either active 
business operations or from “passive” investment income such as dividends 
and interest. 
Developing countries often provide for deductions and exemptions 
for different types of savings under the personal income tax.96  In several 
countries, individuals can deduct life insurance premiums and pension 
contributions and are not taxed on most types of interest and dividend 
income.97  But even when countries include different types of portfolio 
income in the tax base, the tax administration often lacks capacity to tax 
this income effectively.98  Those countries that succeed in collecting tax 
revenue generally do so by using final withholding tax regimes, often at tax 
rates substantially below rates applicable to other types of income.99 
Both developed and developing countries face substantial 
challenges in taxing portfolio income that crosses national borders.100  First, 
consider the challenges in taxing residents on their portfolio income earned 
outside the country.  The “international tax compromise” resulting from the 
League of Nations model treaty generally allocates active business income 
to the country where it is earned (the source jurisdiction) and portfolio 
income to the country from which the capital is supplied (the residence 
                                                                                                                 
TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX:  LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 101, 111–12. 118–19 
(James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Sally Wallace eds., 2004). 
 95. Bird & Zolt, supra note 6, at 1658–59. 
 96. Ved. P. Gandhi, Relevance of Supply-Side Tax Policy to Developing Countries:  A 
Summary, in SUPPLY-SIDE TAX POLICY:  ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9, 24–
25 (Ved P. Gandhi et al. eds., 1987). 
 97. Jitendra R. Modi et al., Statistical Tables, in SUPPLY-SIDE TAX POLICY:  ITS 
RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 337, Table A10 at 366–67 (Ved P. Gandhi et al. 
eds., 1987) [hereinafter Modi et al., Statistical Tables]. 
 98. For extensive discussion of the weakness of tax administration in most developing 
countries, see, e.g., IMPROVING TAX ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Richard 
M. Bird & Milka Casanegra, eds., 1992) and ARINDAM DAS-GUPTA & DILIP MOOKHERJEE, 
INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN TAX ENFORCEMENT:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE (1998). 
 99. Tanzi & Zee, supra note 5, at 18–19; Modi et al., Statistical Tables, supra note 97, 
Table A11, at 368. 
 100. Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX 
L. REV. 537 (2003); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). 
194 COLUMBIA JOUR$AL OF TAX LAW [Vol. 1:174 
jurisdiction).101  But while countries have the right to tax their residents on 
their portfolio income earned outside the country, several countries choose 
to tax their residents only on income earned in their country.102  In the 
absence of effective information exchange or withholding regimes, even 
those countries that tax their residents on their world-wide income have 
limited ability to tax their residents’ foreign-source income effectively.103  
The use of tax havens and bank secrecy laws make it difficult for taxing 
authorities to track the investments of their residents.104  Developed 
countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan face substantial 
challenges in taxing this foreign-source income; developing countries with 
less administrative capacity face even greater difficulties.105 
Second, consider the challenges to taxing foreign investors on their 
portfolio income from local investments.  While many source countries 
impose withholding taxes on portfolio income paid by domestic persons to 
foreign investors, both developed and developing countries collect little 
revenue from portfolio investments held by non-residents.106  Exceptions to 
withholding requirements often apply to interest income.  In 1984, 
Congress repealed the U.S. withholding tax on portfolio interest income 
held by non-U.S. residents.107  The failure of the U.S. to tax foreign 
investors on income earned on U.S. debt obligations makes it difficult for 
all countries to impose taxes on portfolio interest, especially developing 
countries.  With respect to other types of portfolio income, many countries 
have entered into tax treaties that trade away the right to collect income on 
passive investments held by foreign investors, presumably hoping to attract 
more foreign investment.108 
Developing countries vary greatly in the tax wedge applicable to 
 
 101. See generally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation:  A 
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996). 
 102. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION:  A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 372–75 (2d. ed 2004). 
 103. Avi-Yonah, supra note 100, at 1584.  
 104. Id. at 1576. 
 105. Id. at 1581–86. 
 106. For a review of the challenges to taxing non-residents in the Philippines see 
Richard D. Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its $on-Resident Citizens, in 
INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL MOBILITY 43 (J. Bhagwati & J. Wilson 
eds., 1989). 
 107. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §127(a) (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 871 (h) (1994)). 
 108. For a recent review of the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting foreign 
investment, see Alexander Klemm, Causes, Benefits, and Risks of Business Tax Incentives 
(IMF Working Paper, No. 09/21, 2009) and for an empirical analysis, see Alexander Klemm 
& Stefan Van Parys, Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives (IMF Working 
Paper, No. 09/136, 2009). 
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labor income.  Differences in relative tax rates under the personal income 
tax system partly explain the variations, but most of the difference is 
attributable to payroll or social security taxes imposed on workers and 
employers to fund unemployment, medical care, or pension benefits.109  
These taxes on labor (and associated benefits) are especially high in many 
Eastern and Central European countries, countries of the former Soviet 
Union, and several Latin American countries.110  To the extent that these 
payroll or social security taxes exceed the value of expected benefits, they 
constitute an additional tax on labor income. 
Corporate tax systems in developing countries vary greatly in scope 
and design.  Many developing countries receive a large percentage of their 
corporate tax revenues from a relatively small number of taxpayers, 
whereas other countries have a more diversified tax base.111  Countries 
differ both as to the level of corporate income tax rates and the relationship 
of the corporate rate to personal income tax rates.  As Table 2 indicates, 
while some regional convergence does exist, there is no easy explanation 
for either the variation in the level of tax rates or the differences between 
personal and corporate rates in these countries. 
  
 
 109. See World Bank, Paying Taxes 2010, app. Table 1.4 (2010) for the estimated size 
of social security and labor taxes paid by employers in most developing countries. 
 110. For discussion, see Rutkowski, supra note 92, at 281; James Alm & Hugo López-
Castaño, Payroll Taxes in Colombia, in FISCAL REFORM IN COLOMBIA 195 (Richard M. Bird 
et al. eds., 2005); John Norregaard & Tehmina S. Kahn, Tax Policy:  Recent Trends and 
Coming Challenges 12–15 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/274, 2007). 
 111. In many developing countries, as little as one percent of taxpayers generate over 
70% of corporate tax revenues.  See Katherine Baer, Olivier P. Benon & Juan A. Toro 
Rivera, Improving Large Taxpayers’ Compliance:  A Review of Country Experience (IMF 
Occasional Paper 215, 2002).  This marked concentration of the tax base has, in many 
countries, led to the creation of Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) dedicated specifically to 
servicing and monitoring such taxpayers.  
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Senegal 50 25 25 
Croatia 45 20 25 
Chile 40 17 23 
Hungary 38 16 22 
Poland 40 19 21 
China 45 25 20 
Slovenia 41 21 20 
Vietnam 40 25 15 
Turkey 35 20 15 
Uzbekistan 25 10 15 
Morocco 42 30 12 
South Africa 40 28 12 
Cyprus 25 15 10 
Georgia 25 15 10 
Indonesia 35 28 7 
Belarus 30 24 6 
Latvia 20 15 5 
Serbia 15 10 5 
Malaysia 28 25 3 
Mexico 30 28 2 
Hong Kong 17 16.5 0.5 
Argentina 35 35 0 
Venezuela 34 34 0 
Guatemala 31 31 0 
Peru 30 30 0 
Tanzania 30 30 0 
El Salvador 25 25 0 
Estonia 21 21 0 
Egypt 20 20 0 
Slovak Republic 19 19 0 
Romania 16 16 0 
Zambia 35 40 -5 
Czech Republic 15 20 -5 
Russia 13 20 -7 
Jordan 25 35 -10 
Kazakhstan 10 20 -10 
Pakistan 20 35 -15 




 112. The data are from Ernst & Young, Global Executive (2009) [hereinafter EY Global 
Executive] and Ernst & Young, The 2009 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (2009) 
[hereinafter EY Worldwide Corp. Tax Guide]. 
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Spending patterns also differ.  The aggregate levels of taxes and 
expenditures are smaller in developing countries than in developed 
countries.113  Expenditure programs to alleviate poverty or to reduce 
inequality are much smaller in developing countries than programs in most 
developed countries.114  Nonetheless, much as in the Nordic countries in the 
1980s, developing countries require tax revenues to support government 
programs and also face challenges in maintaining or increasing income tax 
revenues from increasing global tax competition.115 
B. Design Choices 
As in the Nordic cases, several design options exist for dual income 
taxes.  The considerations in choosing tax rates and bases differ from the 
Nordic countries and also vary substantially among developing countries. 
1. Personal income tax system. 
The first set of design options under the personal income tax 
system involves choices as to the level of tax rates and the relationship of 
tax rates for income from capital and income from labor.  The options for 
any particular country are strongly influenced by the tax rates of the 
existing tax regime, as well as the tax rates of other countries in the 
region.116 
Choices as to the level of tax rates include both the positive 
marginal tax rates and the zero-bracket amounts (also referred to as the tax 
free minimum or basic allowance).  Marginal income tax rates under 
personal income tax systems have declined substantially in recent 
decades.117  The dispersion of rates among countries has also narrowed 
considerably, particularly within regions.118  As markets for both labor and 
 
 113. Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stern, Taxation and Development, 31 J. OF ECON. LIT. 
762, 764–75 (1993). 
 114. Chu, Davoodi & Gupta, supra note 11, at 34–37. 
 115. Avi-Yonah, supra note 100, at 1640–41.  See also Martin Ravallion, Do Poorer 
Countries Have Less Capacity for Redistribution? (World Bank Policy Research Paper 
5046, September 2009).  Ravallion estimates that guaranteeing poverty-line income 
($1.25/day) to the poorest in those countries with annual consumption per capita of less than 
$2,000 would require marginal tax rates on the non-poor (those above the “poverty line”) of 
over 100% to eliminate the poverty gap, while for high-income developing countries (those 
with per capita consumption over $4,000), this goal could be achieved with an average rate 
of only 1%.  Id. at 20.  
 116. Norregaard & Kahn, supra note 110, at 3–6. 
 117. Peter, Buttrick & Duncan, supra note 22, at 2. 
 118. In Latin America, for example, the average tax rate on corporations fell from 41% 
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capital become more integrated, policymakers face greater constraints on 
their ability to set tax rates for labor and capital income.119  Such constraints 
are clearly much greater for countries in the developing world than they are 
for larger, more developed countries (like United States and Germany) that 
may to some extent be able to tax agglomeration (location) rents without 
unduly discouraging investment.120  The most common location rents found 
in developing countries are those in the natural resource sector or those 
related to government grants of exclusive rights to provide goods or 
services.121 
For developing countries with relatively high top marginal rates 
under their personal income tax systems (35% or greater), the move to a 
dual income tax regime will likely mean substantial reductions in tax rates 
(which may allow policymakers the opportunity to expand the tax base).122  
However, the amount of room for tax rate reductions depends on the 
distribution of taxable income and the relative amounts of tax revenue 
collected from taxpayers in the highest marginal tax brackets.123  Even 
countries with moderate or comparatively low marginal tax rates will likely 
face pressure to reduce tax rates as part of any major tax reform. 
Under the existing tax regimes, countries have taken different 
approaches to the size of the zero-bracket amount.  The choice of the zero-
bracket amount influences the proportion of the population subject to tax 
liability and the level of progressivity of the personal income tax, especially 
for low-income individuals.124  The choice also affects the relationship 
                                                                                                                 
in 1985 to 29% in 2003, and the top rate on personal income from 51% to 28%.  Eduardo 
Lora & Mauricio Cárdenas, La Reforma de las instituciones fiscales en América Latina 34 
(Inter-American Dev. Bank Res. Dept., Documento de Trabajo No. 559, 2006). 
 119. See generally Richard M. Bird & Charles E. McLure Jr., The Personal Income Tax 
in an Interdependent World, in THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX:  PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES? 235 
(S. Cnossen & R.M. Bird, eds., 1990). 
 120. See Sørensen & Johnson, supra note 53, at 25. 
 121. Anwar Shah and John Whalley argue persuasively that such “rents” are generally 
much more important in developing than developed countries.  Anwar Shah & John 
Whalley, Tax Incidence Analysis of Developing Countries:  An Alternative View, 5 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 532 (1990). 
 122. Many of the flat tax reforms discussed in the next section provided for an 
expansion of the tax base to help minimize revenue losses from rate reductions.  See infra 
notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 123. In a few developing countries, such as Papua New Guinea, almost all personal 
income tax revenues were collected from expatriates who were subject to the top rate of the 
personal income tax rate schedule.  Richard M. Bird, Taxation in Papua $ew Guinea:  
Backwards to the Future?, 17 WORLD DEV. 1145, 1150–51 (1989).  Such countries may 
have little to gain by lowering this rate and much revenue to lose. 
 124. Countries vary greatly in the proportion of individual income tax payers to total 
population, with low-income countries having much lower participation rates as compared to 
medium-income and high-income countries.  Modi et al., Statistical Tables, supra note 97, 
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between the regular income tax system and presumptive tax regimes that 
apply to taxpayers who are either operating in the informal sector or are 
considered too small to be worth including in the regular tax system. 
Many developing countries have different types of presumptive tax 
regimes that seek to tax micro and small businesses by reference to factors 
other than income, such as sales, number of employees, or size of 
establishment.125  The aim of such presumptive tax regimes is to reduce 
administrative and compliance costs and to educate and develop taxpayers 
to where they can enter the regular income tax system.  When presumptive 
tax regimes are in place, introducing a dual income tax which taxes 
corporate (or large enterprise) profits and personal capital income (or small 
enterprise profits) at the same rate reduces tax differences based on size of 
enterprise.  Another partial solution would be to adopt different tax rates on 
active business income and passive income from capital, with the former 
close to the higher labor income rate and the latter closer to the lowest rate 
on labor income.126 
Policymakers also need to consider whether to adopt a zero-bracket 
amount for capital income under a personal income tax system.  On equity 
grounds, providing tax relief for small investors may make sense.  
However, countries with final withholding regimes for different types of 
capital income are likely to find it administratively challenging to have a 
sufficiently good reporting system to provide for refunds for small 
investors. 
The major policy decision in adopting a dual income tax regime is 
setting the relative tax rates for capital and labor income.  While the Nordic 
countries set the rate for capital income at (or near) the lowest tax rate 
applicable to labor income, different considerations may apply in 
developing countries.  In the pre-dual income tax regime of the Nordic 
countries, many types of capital income were nominally subject to the high 
marginal tax rates applicable to income from labor, although these rates 
were applied very unevenly.127  By contrast, in developing countries where 
almost all tax revenue is from wage withholding in the formal sector, 
                                                                                                                 
Table A5, at 360.  While in many countries the choice of the zero-bracket amount is driven 
largely by revenue concerns, several other important design elements may also arise.  For 
example, raising the zero-bracket amount would relieve a substantial number of existing 
taxpayers from the obligation to file income tax declarations.  This was an important 
consideration in Uruguay’s move to a dual income tax.  Barreix & Roca, supra note 18, at 
131. 
 125. For some examples, see Richard M. Bird & Sally Wallace, Is It Really So Hard to 
Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The Context and Role of Presumptive Taxes, in TAXING THE HARD-TO-
TAX:  LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 121, 135–36 (James Alm et al. eds., 2004). 
 126. This approach was adopted in Uruguay.  Barreix & Roca, supra note 18. 
 127. Sørensen, From the Global Income Tax, supra note 18, at 60. 
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applying (and effectively, collecting) any tax on either active business 
income (from businesses not in corporate form) or passive income would 
likely be a tax increase.  For countries that apply final withholding taxes 
under their current personal income tax regimes on passive income such as 
dividends, interest, and some types of rents and royalties, the existing tax 
rates on this income from capital are likely substantially below the rates 
applicable to income from labor.128 
Box 1 sets forth some rate alternatives under a dual income tax for 
a personal income tax system. 
 
Box 1.  Rate Alternatives under Dual Income Tax for Personal 
Income Tax Systems 
Highest marginal tax rates for labor income higher than tax rate on 
capital income 
• Top marginal rate for labor income substantially higher than  capital 
tax rate (Nordic model with 15-25% rate differential) 
• Top marginal rate for labor income slightly higher than capital tax 
rate (perhaps differential of 10% of less) 
Tax rate on capital income higher than lowest positive rate on labor 
income 
• Tax rate on capital income set higher than top marginal rate on labor 
income 
• Tax rate on capital income set at top marginal rate on labor income 
• Tax rate on capital income set at  a rate between the lowest and 
highest marginal tax rate on labor income 
 
Consider the potential consequences from changing the relationship 
between tax rates for capital and labor.  Assuming, for purposes of this 
discussion, reasonable levels of tax compliance, setting the tax rate on 
capital at the highest rate applicable to labor income would reverse the tax 
incentives present in Nordic countries by encouraging taxpayers to 
characterize capital income as labor income.  However, if compliance levels 
were low, it is unlikely that many potential evaders would have to engage in 
such strategy.  If they want to evade taxes, they can do so more easily by 
 
 128. Several countries in Latin America impose schedular taxes on some types of capital 
income.  These schedular capital taxes generally apply different tax rates to different types 
of capital income.  See, e.g., Barreix & Roca, supra note 18, at 129 (tax treatment of capital 
income in Uruguay). 
2010] DUAL I$COME TAXATIO$ 201 
simply under-reporting income.  Setting the tax rate on capital at the middle 
of the labor income tax range would also create some interesting incentives.  
Taxpayers whose labor income would be taxed at the higher end of the 
progressive tax rate schedule may seek to characterize part of their income 
from labor as income from (lower-taxed) capital.  On the other hand, 
taxpayers whose labor income would be taxed at the lower end of the 
progressive tax rate schedule may try to characterize part of their income 
from capital as income from labor, but not enough to move the labor 
income to a higher bracket.129 
The trade-off is between achieving additional progressivity from 
taxing labor income and the potential distortions and arbitrage opportunities 
from the different tax rates applicable to income from labor and capital.  
While the gap in the Nordic countries between the flat tax rate applicable to 
income from capital and the top rate under the progressive schedule for 
labor income was (and continues to be) substantial,130 the difference 
between the tax rates for capital and labor income in many developing 
countries would likely be much smaller, primarily because of the 
difficulties developing countries would face in imposing such high tax rates 
on labor income.  The smaller the gap between capital and labor income tax 
rates, the less incentive taxpayers have to disguise the form of their income 
thereby lowering the potential revenue losses from such strategies. 
Another design consideration is how broadly to define the capital 
income component of a dual income tax under a personal income tax 
system.  Some forms of capital income are simple to define in principle:  
interest income, dividends, royalties, and rents.  In almost all countries, it 
should be possible to tax the first three of these items at a flat rate under a 
final withholding regime.  The application of final withholding taxes to 
these payments from firms, whether to domestic or foreign recipients, 
would improve efficiency by increasing the symmetry of tax treatment of 
capital income and simplify administration.  For many countries, adopting 
final withholding regimes would both expand the tax base and likely 
improve the overall progressivity of the tax system.131 
Assuming taxes on dividends are collected under a final 
 
 129. The existence, level, and structure of payroll taxes will also influence incentives to 
avoid characterization as labor income. 
 130. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 131. Some adjustments in tax treaties would likely be required.  One reason for 
imposing similar final withholding tax regimes on payments to foreign and domestic 
taxpayers is to reduce incentives for domestic taxpayers to use foreign entities to avoid 
withholding tax liabilities.  Policymakers could also extend final withholding taxes to returns 
from pensions.  Sørensen & Johnson, supra note 53.  However, doing so would raise the 
difficult question of whether such returns constitute capital income or deferred labor income. 
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withholding regime (or alternatively, dividends are excluded from income), 
the question of whether and how to tax capital gains on corporate shares at 
the individual level remains.  One alternative is simply to exempt these 
capital gains from taxation.  If the dual income tax system provided for full 
integration of distributed earnings and interest payments, any remaining 
gains on corporate shares would presumably largely reflect inflation, and 
exemption would be appropriate.132  A second alternative is to tax capital 
gains at the individual level.  If such gains were taxed when realized, 
individual taxpayers should be allowed to adjust the cost basis of their 
shares to reflect any taxed, but undistributed, earnings at the corporate 
level.  A third alternative is to tax capital gains only for shares held for less 
than a specific period of time, for example, one year.  This approach would 
prevent taxpayers from engaging in schemes to avoid tax on labor income 
by selling their shares to reduce or evade tax liability.  Unfortunately none 
of these solutions is perfect, or simple to implement. 
An interesting design alternative maintains the progressive rate 
structure for labor income and provides for two different regimes for taxing 
income from capital:  a relatively low flat tax rate on portfolio investment 
income and a higher flat tax rate on income related to active businesses.  
Uruguay adopted a version of this dual income tax system (or perhaps more 
accurately, a tripartite tax system) in July 2007.133  Under the Uruguayan 
dual income tax, labor income is taxed at rates ranging from 10% to 25%.134  
Portfolio income is taxed at a 12% rate through a final withholding 
regime.135  Self-employed persons can choose between being taxed under 
the business tax regime (at a 25% tax rate after deducting business 
expenses) or paying under the labor income tax regime at the 25% rate 
(with allowance for personal deductions and presumed expenses of 30% of 
receipts, an effective rate of 17.5%).136 
2. Relationship of Personal Income Tax Rates and Corporate Tax 
Rates under a Dual Income Tax. 
Once the tax rates are set under the personal income tax system and 
 
 132. George R. Zodrow, Corporate Income Taxation in Canada, 56 CAN. TAX J. 392, 
461 (2009).  Alternatively, Sørensen & Johnson, supra note 53, at 101, 121–26 propose a 
system of accrual taxation for gains in financial assets.  Successful implementation of such a 
system, however, is likely beyond the capacity of most developing and developed countries. 
 133. Barreix & Roca, supra note 18, at 122. 
 134. Unlike the prior tax regime in Uruguay, the dual income tax regime imposed taxes 
on professional services, interest, rent, and capital gains.  A substantial zero bracket excludes 
60% of the population from the tax system.  Id. at 131. 
 135. Id. at 130. 
 136. Id. 
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the line is somehow drawn between capital and labor income, the next issue 
is the relationship of the personal income tax rate to the corporate income 
tax rate.  As set forth in Box 2, several alternatives exist. 
 
Box 2.  Relationship of Tax Rate on Capital under the Personal Tax 
Regime and the Corporate Tax Rate 
• Pure Nordic System:  Set corporate tax rate at the same level as the 
capital tax rate under the personal income tax (and at the lowest 
positive tax rate for labor income) 
• Set corporate tax rate higher than either the personal income tax 
rates for income from capital or income from labor 
• Set corporate tax rate lower than the personal income tax rates for 
income from capital or income from labor 
 
Under the “pure” Nordic dual income tax system, the corporate tax 
rate is set at the tax rate for capital income (and the lowest positive rate on 
labor income).137  The income shifting resulting from lower corporate 
income tax rates has, in several European countries, shown up primarily in 
the form of lower personal income tax revenues as more small businesses 
have incorporated to take advantage of the tax differential.138  For 
businesses in developing countries that are actually paying tax under the 
personal income tax system, a lower corporate tax rate would encourage 
businesses to incorporate.  If greater use of the corporate form were to 
occur in developing countries, this would have the beneficial effect of 
increasing the size of the formal sector in those countries and expanding the 
potential tax base reachable with the available administrative resources. 
A second alternative sets the corporate tax rate higher than the 
personal tax rates for either income from labor or income from capital.  To 
the extent corporate tax revenues are derived primarily from large 
corporations with substantial foreign ownership, the corporate income tax 
acts as a final withholding tax on the income derived in the country.  If the 
corporate tax applies primarily to businesses engaged in extracting natural 
resources or other activities that generate location-specific excess returns, 
then this alternative might raise revenue without substantial economic 
distortions.139  However, setting the corporate tax rate higher than the 
 
 137. Sørensen, supra note 12, at 212–13. 
 138. Ruud de Mooij & Gaetan Nicodème, How Corporate Tax Competition Reduces 
Personal Tax Revenue, 6 CESIFO DICE REPORT, Spring 2008, at 27. 
 139. As Keen and Mansour note, however, even in the case of natural resources, 
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personal tax rate would discourage small businesses from incorporating, 
and depending on the corporate tax rate chosen compared to tax rates in 
other countries, may discourage foreign investment.140 
A third alternative sets the corporate tax rate below the personal tax 
rates either for income from labor or income from capital.  For those 
countries where income tax revenues are derived almost completely from 
wage withholding, this alternative achieves many of the same results as the 
Nordic dual income tax systems.  It provides for a lower tax rate on income 
in corporate form as a means of addressing tax competition concerns.  Low 
corporate taxes could encourage domestic and foreign investment, while 
progressive tax rates could be maintained for labor income.  It would also, 
however, create incentives for those with substantial income from labor to 
incorporate to reduce tax liability. 
3. Taxation of Normal and Excess Returns. 
Economists distinguish between the normal return to capital and 
rents or excess returns. For debt capital, the normal rate of return is the 
market rate of interest on debt in the relevant risk class.  For equity capital, 
the normal rate of return is determined by the market rate on stocks with 
similar risk characteristics.141  An extensive economic literature argues 
against imposing tax on the “normal” rate of return on capital, especially in 
small open economies in which both the elasticity of supply of capital and 
the desire to increase the capital stock are likely quite high.142 
Box 3 sets forth several alternative regimes for taxing entities on 
the returns from debt and equity investments.  The first alternative is the 
conventional corporate income tax which allows the deduction of interest 
but taxes the full returns to corporate equity without distinguishing between 
normal and excess returns.  The second alternative seeks to tax all returns at 
the entity level either by disallowing a deduction for interest or by imposing 
a final withholding tax on dividends and interest at the entity level at the 
same rate as the corporate tax.  The CBIT proposal discussed earlier is an 
example of this approach.  The third alternative seeks to tax only excess 
                                                                                                                 
countries may compete owing to scarcity of skills needed for resource extraction.  Michael 
Keen & Mario Mansour, Revenue Mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Challenges from 
Globalization 11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/157, 2009). 
 140. Klemm and Van Parys emphasize that even if (as their study suggests) countries 
may sometimes succeed through fiscal incentives in attracting foreign investment, there is no 
persuasive evidence that the result is increased total investment and growth.  Klemm & Van 
Parys, supra note 108, at 21. 
 141. Sørensen, supra note 12, at 176.  
 142. Id. at 175; Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open 
Economies?, 47 J. FIN. 1159 (1992). 
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returns.  In recent years, several alternatives for excluding the normal return 
on capital from the tax base have been proposed under a variety of names 
and labels, such as cash flow taxation and Allowance for Corporate Equity 
(ACE).143  A dual income tax system with a relatively low but positive tax 
rate on capital income might be an appropriate compromise between the 
theoretically optimal zero tax rate on capital in a small open economy and 
the political economy arguments that might justify high tax rates on capital 
income.144  In addition, in at least some instances, countries may wish to 
consider imposing a separate cash-flow tax for  firms that earn returns well 
in excess of the normal return on capital (for example, because they are able 
to capture location rents from access to limited natural resources).145  The 
fourth alternative provides entities with a deduction for an imputed rate of 
return on both debt and equity capital and imposes taxes at the individual 
level on interest, dividends, and capital gains.  The final alternative taxes 
the normal returns to capital at a low flat rate but taxes excess returns at the 
same progressive marginal tax rates applicable to labor income.  Norway 
has adopted a variation of this approach with respect to income of closely-
held corporations.146 
 
Box 3.  Treatment of ormal and Excess Returns under Dual 
Income Tax Systems 
• Tax full returns of equity and  allow a deduction for interest paid at 
entity level 
• Tax full return of debt and equity at entity level 
• Tax only excess returns at entity level with no tax at investor level 
• Tax only excess return at entity level and tax normal returns at 
investor level 
• Tax normal returns at low flat tax rate and tax excess returns at the 
same progressive tax rates applicable to labor income 
 
Choosing among the alternatives requires policymakers to balance 
 
 143. For a recent review of such proposals in the context of a developed country, see 
Sørensen & Johnson, supra note 53, at 79.  See also Klemm, supra note 108, at 9 
(considering similar arguments in a developing country context). 
 144. George R. Zodrow, Corporate Income Taxation in Canada, 56 CAN. TAX J. 392, 
460 (2008).  On the arguments for taxing capital income, see, e.g., John Head & Richard 
Krever, Taxing Capital Income, 22 AUSTRL. TAX F. 83 (2007). 
 145. See ROSE GARNAUT & ANTHONY CLUNIES-ROSS, TAXATION OF MINERAL RENTS 
(Oxford 1983) for an example of a resource tax proposal. 
 146. Sørensen, supra note 12, at 214–17. 
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several competing objectives.  Reducing economic distortions will provide 
support (particularly in small economies) for exempting the normal returns 
from capital.147  However, if countries seek to raise the same amount of 
revenue from corporate taxes, a smaller tax base under a corporate tax 
regime that exempts normal returns will require higher tax rates.  For 
example, if policymakers seek to raise $100 million in tax revenue, they 
could raise that amount by choosing to tax only the excess returns at the 
entity level (alternative 3) and have tax rates of, say, 35%, or tax full 
returns of debt and equity at the entity level (alternative 2) and have tax 
rates of 20%. 
Finally, with the reduction of personal and corporate tax rates, the 
need for specific provisions to reduce the double taxation of distributed 
corporate income (and the double taxation associated with capital gains 
attributable to previously taxed corporate income) may be much reduced in 
developing countries.  In addition, the potential double taxation also serves 
to reduce incentives for owner-managers of closely-held corporations to 
disguise labor income as capital income.148  With respect to capital gains on 
corporate shares, if the corporate tax rate is set equal to the capital income 
tax rate under the dual income tax, then not only can dividends be exempt 
from withholding taxes but in effect the proportion of capital gains 
attributable to increased corporate earnings is also taxed at the same rate.149  
Although it is difficult to think of an administratively feasible way to tax 
the component of real capital gains on shares attributable to goodwill, even 
this limited leveling out of the tax arbitrage playing field would be a 
substantial improvement in most developing countries. 
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Dual Income Tax Regimes in 
Developing Countries 
Moving to a dual income tax regime offers both advantages and 
disadvantages as compared to the current tax regimes in developing 
countries.  As tax systems and tax environments differ greatly among 
countries, so do the relative advantages and disadvantages, as well as the 
relative costs and benefits, from undertaking major tax reforms.  Moreover, 
in some instances similar advantages could be achieved by reforms other 
 
 147. See Joel Slemrod, Carl Hansen & Roger Procter, The Seesaw Principle in 
International Tax Policy, 65 J. PUB. ECON. 163 (1997). 
 148. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 48. 
 149. Dividend exemption is not an essential element of a dual income tax.  If full 
dividend integration is not desired, countries could subject dividends to taxation under the 
personal income tax regime, or provide for partial imputation by providing credit for taxes 
paid at the entity level. 
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than moving to a dual income tax regime. 
The dual income tax provides greater flexibility to developing 
countries that wish to reduce tax rates by allowing them to lower tax rates 
on capital income while maintaining (or adopting smaller reductions for) 
tax rates on labor income.  As discussed in the next section, the ability to 
set separate rates for labor and capital income is also an important factor in 
choosing between dual income taxes and flat taxes.  Adopting separate tax 
rates for labor and capital income may have both revenue and progressivity 
implications.  Countries can respond to pressure to reduce tax rates by 
lowering rates on capital income while maintaining, and perhaps increasing, 
the current tax revenue generated from labor income.  The progressivity 
implications of moving to a dual income tax are less clear-cut and depend 
greatly on the distribution of tax burdens for labor and capital income under 
the current tax system. 
In addition, a move to a dual income tax regime could help 
rationalize the taxation of income from capital, whether income from 
passive investments or active business operations.  A single rate would 
provide more symmetric and less distorting treatment of income from 
passive investments.  It might also allow countries to conform the relative 
tax treatment of passive investment income received by resident and non-
resident investors.  The move to a dual income tax regime could result in 
significant administrative gains from increased use of information reporting 
as well as increased use of provisional and, especially, final withholding.150  
The move to a dual income tax could also help rationalize the tax treatment 
of income from active businesses under the personal or corporate tax 
regimes.  Adopting the same tax rate for income from active business under 
the personal tax system and under the corporate tax system will eliminate 
tax-induced distortion as to choice of business form. 
A dual income tax regime with relatively low tax rates on business 
income and relatively low corporate tax rates may represent an 
improvement over tax regimes that combine high tax rates on capital with 
special tax incentives, especially those incentives designed to attract foreign 
investment.  Whether this move to a dual income tax would lower costs of 
capital and increase domestic and foreign investment is a difficult empirical 
question and likely varies depending on country-specific factors.151  It 
depends partly on how successful past tax incentives have been in attracting 
 
 150. Whether taxpayers’ compliance costs would also be reduced depends on the 
obligations imposed on taxpayers and other parties to report and withhold, and on the 
specific types of income included in the dual income tax regime. 
 151. Liam P. Ebrill, Income Taxes and Investment:  Some Empirical Relationships for 
Developing Countries, in SUPPLY-SIDE TAX POLICY:  ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 115, 133–34 (Ved P. Gandhi et al. eds., 1987). 
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investment in developing countries.  Although the evidence is not entirely 
clear, such incentives have been more successful in increasing the inflow of 
foreign direct investment to middle-income countries or those with 
significant natural resources than to low-income countries without 
significant natural resources, which have made most use of these 
incentives.152  It is also not clear whether tax incentives generate additional 
new investment or new ownership of existing investments.153  Although 
foreign capital inflows appear to respond to tax incentives, what may be 
changing is more the ownership of capital than the amount of real 
investment.154  The relative advantage of a dual income tax over current 
regimes that pair high tax rates with high tax incentives also depends on 
how successful a low flat rate tax on capital would be in increasing the level 
of investment as compared to an existing regime with high tax rates and 
generous tax incentives.  While supporters of low flat tax rates claim low 
taxes have increased investment and increased tax revenue in several 
countries, it is difficult to isolate the effect of tax changes on the costs of 
capital from the effect of other tax and fiscal reforms.155 
 
 152. Klemm & Van Parys, supra note 108, at 18 find (for a wider sample of developing 
countries) that foreign direct investment responds positively to increased tax incentives, and 
in particular, tax holidays. 
 153. The available data for developing countries do not separate foreign capital inflows 
into real and financial flows.  It is therefore not clear whether the tax incentives generate 
additional new investment or new ownership of existing investments. Because neither 
increased total real investment nor economic growth appears to be associated with the 
increased foreign direct investment inflows, it may be that either such financial transfers 
dominate or higher foreign investment inflows ‘crowd out’ domestically-financed 
investment.  Klemm & Van Parys, supra note 108, at 15. 
 154. Id. at 19–20.  This result is not inconsistent with the meta-study of corporate tax 
elasticities in developed countries as reported by Ruud A. de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen in 
Corporate Tax Elasticities:  A Reader’s Guide to Empirical Findings, 24 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y. 680, 686 (2008).  This study finds by far the highest and most significant 
responses of international corporate capital flows reflect profit shifting in response to 
changes in statutory rates, but that there is also a significant effect on real capital inflows 
when effective marginal tax rates on capital are lowered, as by incentives.  Id. at 694–95.  
However, as Klemm & Van Parys, supra note 108, at 20, note that such positive effects of 
tax incentives on real investment (and growth) appear to be conditional on the existence of 
precisely those institutional and financial aspects of absorptive capacity that are generally 
missing in developing countries.  See, for example, the extensive analysis in WORLD BANK, 
DOING BUSINESS 2010:  REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT TIMES (2009) [hereinafter WORLD 
BANK]. 
 155. Compare Daniel J. Mitchell, Eastern Europe’s Flat Tax Revolution, 37 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 989 (2005)(flat tax reforms have generated impressive results, including faster growth, 
more jobs, and increased competitiveness) with Clifford G. Gaddy & William G. Gale, 
Demythologizing the Russian Flat Tax, 37 TAX NOTES INT’L 983, 988 (2005)(difficult to 
establish causal link between flat tax reforms and economic growth and higher tax revenue 
because of other concurrent factors that influence growth and tax compliance). 
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Removing tax preferences and exclusions and simply moving to a 
lower statutory rate would simplify tax regimes for both individual and 
corporate taxes, thus reducing both administrative and compliance costs.  
The latter point is particularly important because such costs appear to create 
a substantial fiscal barrier to the formalization of many economic 
enterprises in developing countries.156  The move to a dual income tax 
regime could also provide a platform on which to incorporate other related 
reforms, such as coordinating presumptive tax regimes for small businesses 
with the regular corporate tax regime and integrating the personal income 
tax system with the payroll or social security tax regimes.  Thus, adopting a 
dual income tax regime may provide the opportunity to coordinate with 
existing presumptive tax regimes and facilitate moving to a regular tax 
system.157 
For countries with substantial payroll taxes, the dual income tax 
provides an opportunity to impose a single tax on labor income that would 
be both more transparent and easier to administer.  For that matter, simply 
integrating the administration of payroll taxes with labor income taxes 
would substantially simplify and improve both systems in many 
countries.158 
The move to a dual income tax also has costs and disadvantages.  
Any major tax reform imposes substantial administrative costs on both 
taxpayers and tax authorities.  Depending on the current tax systems in 
developing countries, the move to a dual income tax could substantially 
raise the cost of debt capital, especially if countries adopt more effective 
final withholding regimes.  Differences in tax rates on labor and capital 
income, as well as any differences between tax rates on capital income 
under the personal tax system and corporate tax rates, would also present 
incentives for taxpayers to structure the type and form of income to reduce 
tax liability.  However, this problem is likely of less concern in developing 
countries, because of the smaller difference in the effective marginal tax 
rates for capital income, labor income and corporate income rate than exists 
in developed countries.159 
Finally, it is important not to compare the dual income tax to some 
 
 156. WORLD BANK, supra note 154, at 9. 
 157. The economic and administrative importance of providing an incentive for firms to 
move from a presumptive to the regular income tax regime is emphasized by Bird & 
Wallace, supra note 125, at 143–44. 
 158. Peter Barrand, Stanford Ross & Graham Harrison, Integrating a Unified Revenue 
Administration for Tax and Social Contribution Collections:  Experiences of Central and 
Eastern European Countries 33 (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/237, 2004). 
 159. The rate differentials will likely be smaller in developing countries because it is 
unlikely that developing countries could successfully adopt and enforce personal income tax 
rates comparable to the high tax rates found in Nordic countries. 
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ideal tax regime with high levels of tax compliance, but rather to the current 
imperfect tax regimes and compliance rates in the particular country.160  
Difficulties exist in estimating the amount of any revenue or progressivity 
gains or losses from the move to a dual income tax without examining the 
details of the proposed reforms and the effectiveness of the existing tax 
regimes.  Revenue gains from adopting a dual income tax would likely be 
greater in those countries where the prior tax treatment of income from 
capital was ineffective and where the change to the dual income tax might 
reduce the size of the informal economy by reducing tax barriers to 
formalization.  Similarly, in developing countries that have relatively 
ineffective taxation of capital income, a dual income tax may even produce 
some progressivity gains, particularly if reforms succeed in reducing taxes 
on income of low wage earners and increasing taxes on income of higher 
wage earners and capital income. 
IV. DUAL INCOME TAX VERSUS FLAT TAX REGIMES 
If policymakers in developing countries wish to retain an income 
tax, there are competing tax reform options.  Choices include trying to 
improve the comprehensive income tax model, adopting a dual income tax, 
or adopting a flat rate tax.161  The choice between a dual income tax and a 
flat tax appears relatively straightforward:  the dual income tax provides for 
a single tax rate only on capital income whereas the flat tax applies a single 
rate to all types of income.  The differences between dual income tax and 
flat tax systems, however, may be greater or less depending on several 
factors, such as the zero bracket amount and rate structure under the 
personal income tax, the tax rate differential between the personal income 
tax system and the corporate tax system, the integration of the personal and 
corporate tax systems, and the presence of payroll or social security tax on 
labor income. 
 
 160. For a similar conclusion with respect to adopting a dual income tax in the United 
States, see Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 45. 
 161. See generally Michael Keen, Yitae Kim & Ricardo Varsano, The “Flat Tax(es)”:  
Principles and Experience, 15 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 712, 715 (2008).  Earlier flat tax 
experiments took place in such diverse places as Hong Kong, and Jamaica.  See Richard 
Cullen & Antonietta Wong, Globalization and the Hong Kong Revenue Regime (Paper 
presented at symposium in honor of Alex Easson Queen’s University Law School, February 
2008); James Alm et al., A Program for Reform, in THE JAMAICAN TAX REFORM 153, 157–58 
(Roy Bahl ed., 1991). 
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A. Recent Flat Tax Reforms 
Several recent tax reforms, particularly in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, have followed a flat 
tax approach.  Table 3 provides information about tax systems in these 
countries both before and after flat tax reforms. 
 
Table 3.  Flat Tax Regimes
162
 
 Year Personal Income Tax 
Rates 
Corporate Income Tax 
Rates 









Estonia 1994 16-33 26 21
a
 35 26 21 
Lithuania 1994 18-33 33 24 29 29 15 
Latvia 1997 10-25 25 20 25 25 15 





2004 10-37 19 19 25 19 19 
Ukraine 2004 10-40 13 30 30 25 25 
Georgia 2005 12-20 12 25
c
 20 20 15 
Romania 2005 18-40 16 16 25 16 16 
Macedonia 2007 15-24 12 10 15 12 10 
Kazakhstan 2007 5-20 10 10 30 30 20 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 12-32 15 15 24 22 20 
Bulgaria 2008 10-24 10 10 10 10 10 
 
a Further rate reductions are planned:  to 20 percent in 2009, 19 percent in 2010 and 18 
percent in 2011. 
b Corporate profit tax rates consist of a 2.5% rate payable to central government and rates 
ranging from 13.5% to 17.5% payable to regional governments. 
c In July of 2007, Georgia merged the 12% flat income tax rate with the 20% social tax rate 
into a single flat 25% rate. 
 
Almost all of these flat tax reforms are income tax systems that 
apply a single tax rate above a zero-bracket amount.163  Though clumped 
together under the flat tax rubric, these reforms vary substantially across 
countries and over time.  They differ in choice of the tax rate as compared 
to the range of tax rates before the reform, the types of income subject to 
 
 162. See Keen, Kim & Varsano, supra note 161; EY Global Executive, supra note 112; 
EY Worldwide Corp. Tax Guide, supra note 112. 
 163. See Brian Jenn, Flat Taxes:  Past, Present, and Future, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 995 
(2006); Pablo Saavedra, Flat Income Tax Reforms, in FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH:  LESSONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 253 (Cheryl Grey, Tracey 
Lane & Aristomene Varoudakis eds., 2007). 
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the single tax rate, the size of the zero-bracket amount, the treatment of 
interest, dividends, and capital gains, and the relationship of the personal 
income tax rate and corporate tax rates before and after the reform.  They 
also differ with respect to interaction with other taxes on labor, such as 
social security or payroll taxes. 
These flat tax reforms are not the consumption-style flat taxes of 
the type that dominated recent tax discussion in the United States.164  These 
reforms retain income as the tax base, but eliminate multiple positive 
marginal tax rates with respect to certain types of income.165  The first wave 
of flat tax reforms (Estonia 1994; Lithuania 1994; and Latvia 1995) 
generally provided a moderately high single tax rate as compared to the 
previously existing tax rates in those countries and as compared to 
international tax rates.166  The reforms applied only to the personal income 
tax systems and left the separate corporate tax regime (with often higher 
corporate tax rates) unchanged.  In contrast, the second wave of flat tax 
reforms (for example, Russia 2001; Kazakhstan 2007; and Bulgaria 2008) 
provided for a flat rate substantially below previous personal income tax 
rates and also low relative to international tax rates.  
As set forth in Table 4, existing flat tax regimes have taken 
different approaches as to both the level of tax rates and the relationship of 
the flat tax rates under the personal tax system and the tax rates under the 
corporate tax system. 
  
 
 164. For a survey of such proposals, see McLure & Zodrow, supra note 9. 
 165. With the exception of Georgia, these reforms retain a zero-bracket amount, so they 
provide for some progressivity in the tax system. 
 166. Keen, Kim & Varsano, supra note 161, at 715–18. 
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Flat tax systems also differ as to the extent to which they integrate 
the personal and corporate tax systems.  Most flat tax systems retain the 
double tax on distributed corporate income (often with final withholding 
regimes), although some exclude tax on further distributions. 
B. Choosing Between a Dual Income Tax and Flat Tax System 
Comparisons between the dual income tax and the flat tax model 
depend on the specific details of the proposals as well as the specific 
circumstances of particular countries.  For dual income tax systems with a 
tax rate on capital income set at the lowest marginal tax rate on labor 
income, the dual income tax can be designed as a flat tax with a surcharge 
on high-income wage earners.  In other words, the difference between the 
two approaches is essentially what is gained or lost by having a progressive 
rate schedule for labor income combined with a flat tax rate on capital 
income. 
Flat tax and dual income tax systems share several advantages over 
the current tax systems in many developing countries.  As discussed in the 
 
 167. The data for this table are from EY Global Executive, supra note 112 and EY 
Worldwide Corp. Tax Guide, supra note 112. 
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previous section, a single tax rate on income from passive investments 
under the personal income tax system will generally provide more 
symmetric and less distorting treatment of this type of capital income, 
reducing wasteful tax-induced distortions in investment and saving 
decisions.  A single tax rate would also be a simpler and more effective way 
to tax capital income and would facilitate use of withholding regimes.  
Combining either a flat tax or a dual income tax reform under the personal 
income tax system with an effective corporate income tax reform may 
result in a more rational approach for taxing active business income.  
Where the move to either a flat tax or a dual income tax results in reforms 
that lower tax rates and broaden tax bases, existing capital should be used 
more efficiently and the flow of capital into the economy should be 
increased.168  Both reforms may in some circumstances also expand 
revenues and make the tax system more progressive with less 
administrative strain and effort than required under a comprehensive 
income tax approach.  This administrative advantage is not a minor 
consideration in developing countries in which administrative capacity is a 
severe constraint on tax policy.169 
Flat tax regimes have advantages over dual income tax regimes.  
For example, if a tax system really has only a single rate on all income, it 
would be simpler to explain, to comply, and to enforce than other 
systems.170  If the single rate under the personal income tax system is also 
aligned with the corporate rate, distortions would be reduced and the 
opportunity for arbitrage would be less than under a dual income tax. 
On the other hand, dual income tax regimes have several 
advantages over flat tax regimes.  By decoupling the taxation of wage and 
capital income tax, policymakers gain an additional degree of freedom to 
address global tax competition concerns or domestic political concerns 
from various interest groups.  It may also be a bit easier for policymakers to 
resist the endless clamor for special concessions and hence avoid 
complicating either component of the income tax system by various 
incentive provisions. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for choosing a dual income tax over 
a flat tax is to maintain at least a modest degree of explicit progressivity in 
the tax system.  Market-driven developing countries generate both growth 
and inequality.  All countries face challenges in maintaining high growth 
 
 168. Studies looking at the revenue and progressivity consequences of moving to a flat 
tax regime emphasize the difficulty of isolating the effects of flat tax reforms from other 
concurrent tax and fiscal reforms.  Keen, Kim & Varsano, supra note 161, at 741. 
 169. Richard M. Bird, Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform, 10 ASIA-PAC. TAX 
BULL. 134 (2004). 
 170. Keen, Kim & Varsano, supra note 161, at 732–36. 
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rates without being derailed by political and social tensions created by 
growing inequality.  For those who believe that an essential element in 
sustaining growth and political stability is to provide some check on the 
ability of those with great private incomes and wealth to influence political 
outcomes, a sustainable democratic tax system must have some explicit 
way of taxing the rich more than the poor.171  Since personal wealth taxes 
seem unlikely to become any more popular anywhere than they are now, 
the combination of a more effective flat rate taxation of capital income, a 
high proportion of which accrues to the rich, and a moderately progressive 
tax on wage income, which has in recent years become increasingly 
unequal in many countries, may be an essential ingredient in any 
sustainable fiscal solution.  This is exactly the combination provided by a 
dual income tax. 
In most developing countries sustainable growth also probably 
requires some expansion of the state to replace the social safety net 
formerly provided for much of the population by extended rural families.172  
An increasingly educated population and expanded infrastructure are also 
needed.  All this may call for larger government programs supported 
primarily by higher tax revenues.  At least modest progressivity in the 
taxation of labor income may be necessary to provide adequate revenues to 
fund government programs that are likely to be an essential component of 
the growth and economic and political sustainability of most countries.  The 
dual income tax may thus both look better and work better than the flat tax 
in the context of many developing countries precisely because it includes a 
more explicit progressive element in the form of a progressive rate structure 
rather than simply a zero-bracket.  In the social and political context of such 
countries it is not enough simply to tax the not-so-poor at a higher rate than 
the poor; as a rule, one must also tax the rich more than the merely well-off 
and more than the average worker as well.173 
 
 171. Different countries may of course choose very different balances of tax levels and 
tax progressivity:  see, for instance, the two quite different approaches to this issue in 
Lindert, supra note 37, and Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, Fairness and 
Redistribution:  U.S. versus Europe (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
9502, 2003). 
 172. For an historical example, see Burbidge’s discussion of the development of social 
security in Canada.  JOHN BURBIDGE, SOCIAL SECURITY IN CANADA:  AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 
(1987). 
 173. On the importance of the role of tax systems in increasing state legitimacy and 
hence capacity to govern effectively, see Brautigram et al. eds., supra note 10.  The key role 
improved governance plays in increasing tax capacity is empirically demonstrated in 
Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, Tax Effort in Developing 
Countries and High Income Countries:  The Impact of Corruption, Voice and 
Accountability, 38 ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y 55 (2008). 
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Although it is difficult to estimate the revenue and progressivity 
effects of moving to a dual income tax or flat tax regime, the introduction 
of an explicit dual income tax approach may thus strengthen rather than 
weaken the role of the personal income tax and the overall tax system in 
developing countries.  An additional consideration of significance in some 
more decentralized countries may be that adopting a dual income tax 
system would make it simpler for sub-national governments to piggyback 
on the labor portion of the tax.174 
V. CONCLUSION 
Moving to a dual income tax system offers both advantages and 
disadvantages as compared to current tax regimes in developing countries.  
A dual income tax provides countries with greater flexibility to address tax 
competition while maintaining a progressive tax regime for labor income.  
A flat tax rate on capital may provide an opportunity both to rationalize the 
taxation of different types of passive income from capital and to eliminate 
many of the tax preferences contained in the personal and corporate tax 
systems.  Generally, the move to a dual income tax system provides a 
uniform lower capital tax rate which, if set at the same level as the 
corporate income tax, could reduce the apparently fatal attraction that draws 
many developing countries towards tax incentives that often erode the tax 
base, provide incentives for rent-seeking and corruption, and provide 
greater benefits to foreign, rather than, domestic investors.  At the same 
time, retaining a progressive tax on labor income will provide some 
progressivity in countries where economic changes result in greater 
inequality.  The combination of these two features provides an opportunity 
to improve tax policy and tax administration substantially in many 
developing countries. 
Dual income tax systems have worked relatively well in the Nordic 
countries.  If developing countries seek to follow this approach, they have 
many options to choose from with respect to the details of a proposed dual 
income tax regime.  The flat personal tax rate on income from capital could 
either follow the Nordic model (set at or near the lowest positive tax rate for 
labor income), or fall at the middle or top of the progressive rate schedule 
for labor income.  To improve compliance, countries could provide for final 
withholding for dividends and interest payments from corporations.  
Ideally, final withholding would be expanded to cover other payors.175  
 
 174. Boadway, supra note 18, at 926. 
 175. For an early proposal along these lines, see Richard M. Bird & Oliver Oldman, The 
Transition to a Global Income Tax:  A Comparative Analysis, 31 BULL. INT’L FISC. DOC. 
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Developing countries could also choose to follow the Uruguayan model, 
and provide for a flat tax rate on passive income from capital at the lowest 
positive tax rate on labor income and a flat tax rate from capital from sole 
proprietorships and closely held corporations at the middle or highest 
rates.176  Alternatively, developing countries could elect to adopt different 
tax treatment for normal and excess returns under dual income tax regimes, 
either exempting normal returns from tax or taxing the normal returns at a 
preferential low flat tax rate and taxing excess returns at the progressive 
marginal tax rates applicable to labor income. 
While the dual income tax provides for a single rate on income 
from capital, at least initially, the flat tax adopted in Eastern European 
countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union provided for a single 
tax rate on income from labor.177  These regimes, however, generally do not 
integrate payroll taxes with the income tax.  This results in considerably 
higher taxes on labor than on capital income.  Moving to an explicit dual 
income tax in which the labor income tax includes the payroll tax would 
provide an opportunity to rationalize the generally erratic distributional 
effects of the existing personal income tax and payroll tax on labor income.  
To the extent that the flat tax regimes increase the coverage of income from 
capital under the personal income tax and income under the corporate tax, 
these tax regimes also may achieve the goals of symmetry and 
comprehensiveness, and depending on the rate adopted, competitiveness.  
Although it is an empirical question, it seems likely that in the context of 
most developing countries a dual income tax would be more progressive 
than a flat tax regime at comparable tax rates. 
Developing countries face different and difficult challenges in 
reforming their tax system; different environments, different objectives, 
capacities and policy trade-offs all come into play.  Given these differences, 
no one approach can resolve the tax challenges facing developing countries.  
Nonetheless, the dual income tax approach appears to provide an 
exceptionally promising basis on which to construct more rational, 
sustainable, productive, and perhaps even more progressive tax systems in 
many developing countries. 
                                                                                                                 
439, 442 (1977). 
 176. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
